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SECURING GLOBAL TRADEMARK EXCEPTIONS:
WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD NEGOTIATE MANDATORY
EXCEPTIONS INTO FUTURE INTERNATIONAL
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
BRIAN S. KAUNELIS*
INTRODUCTION
Are trademark owners' intellectual property rights starting to retreat
from their high watermark in the international context? In December 2007,
the European Union and the CARIFORUM States1 concluded a bilateral
economic partnership agreement (the EC-CARIFORUM Agreement) that
included a mandatory exception to trademark owners' rights. The EC-
CARIFORUM Agreement is the first agreement that mandates the inclu-
sion of Article 172 of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement
on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights3 (TRIPS) and requires an
exception to trademark fights. This Note will detail why the United States
should follow the European Union's lead and also negotiate mandatory
trademark exceptions into future bilateral agreements.
Part I outlines the background and development of the WTO and
TRIPS, the advent of TRIPS-plus provisions, and the EC-CARIFORUM
agreement and its implications. Part II presents the current state of United
States trademark law and its exceptions. Specifically, this section will de-
tail United States exceptions, their application to case law, and evaluate
* Executive Notes and Comments Editor, Chicago-Kent Law Review, 2009-2010; J.D. Candi-
date, May 2010, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology; B.S. Mechanical
Engineering, University of Michigan, 2001. 1 would like to thank my wife, Lauren Kaunelis, for her
patience and support throughout law school. I would also like to thank Professor Graeme Dinwoodie for
his guidance and advice on this Note.
1. Antigua and Barbuda, the Commonwealth of the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, the Common-
wealth of Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, the Republic of Guyana, the Republic of Haiti,
Jamaica, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Republic of
Suriname, and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. 2008 O.J. (L 289) 3, available at
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/february/tradoc_137971.pdf [hereinafter EC-CARIFORUM
Agreement].
2. See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC: Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 17, Apr. 15, 1994, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
3. Id.
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which exceptions are sufficiently developed to be included in future inter-
national bilateral agreements. Part III discusses the EC-CARIFORUM
Agreement explaining the protections that it offers, why it was an abnormal
provision in a bilateral agreement, and the likely policy reasons and other
external factors behind its inclusion. Finally, Part IV will consider why the
United States should follow the European Union's lead and also negotiate
mandatory trademark exceptions into future bilateral agreements. In par-
ticular, this section will detail why the United States must negotiate on a
bilateral, rather than a multilateral, basis, the reasons for pursuing excep-
tions to trademark rights, as well as the scope of the exceptions and
whether the United States should negotiate more expansive exceptions than
the EC-CARIFORUM Agreement.
I. BACKGROUND
The TRIPS Agreement 4 is the most comprehensive multilateral
agreement on Intellectual Property (IP) law. It establishes mandatory
minimum standards of protection for each of the main areas of IP, institutes
procedures and remedies for the enforcement of IP rights, and offers dis-
pute resolution between WTO members. 5 TRIPS was negotiated at the end
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations of the General
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade in 1994 after a push by the United States,
European Union, and Japan to link IP and trade rules in the WTO.6
Much like prior trade agreements that linked trade and IP,7 TRIPS was
the natural byproduct of the increasingly global market economy. 8 Devel-
oped countries 9 needed to find new ways to exploit their comparative ad-
vantage as they were no longer the leaders in manufacturing due to
developing countries10 displacing them.1 1 Thus, developed countries
4. Id.
5. Id.; Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual
Property Protection, I U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 125, 128 (2003-04) (noting that the "TRIPS Agree-
ment remains the premier international intellectual property treaty").
6. Daniel J. Gervais, Introduction to INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT:
STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONoMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA xv, xv (Daniel J. Gervais
ed., 2007).
7. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, avail-
able at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/beme/trtdocswo001.html [hereinafter Berne Convention];
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/trtdocs_wo020.html [hereinafter Paris Convention].
8. Okediji, supra note 5, at 127.
9. Such as the United States, European Union, and Japan.
10. Presently, the Developing Countries under TRIPS are: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Chile, China,
Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, C6te d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El
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changed their strategic focus to "innovation and information products,"
which could be sustained in the new global economy. 12 However, prior to
developed countries, foreign investors, and innovators placing their first-
world assets in third-world countries, minimum standards of protection
were needed to prevent rampant misappropriation of the information and
innovation goods.13 TRIPS provided the protection that developed coun-
tries needed to enter the markets of developing and least-developed coun-
tries 14 by establishing a global baseline of minimum IP standards. 15
Moreover, developed countries contended that minimum standards of IP
protection would equally benefit developing and least-developed countries
as the holders of IP rights would be protected in both rich and poor coun-
tries. Additionally, the IP protection was necessary to stimulate economic
growth in those countries as IP was believed to be an essential element of
development. 16
In addition to its protections, TRIPS was also responsive to the needs
of developing and least-developed countries by offering flexibility.17 One
of the main methods by which developing and least-developed countries
were given flexibility was in the transition period allotted prior to fully
implementing the TRIPS provisions. 18 Furthermore, each country was
given the freedom to determine the appropriate means of enacting the pro-
visions into their legal system. 19 And finally, each WTO member may en-
act more stringent standards of IP protection provided the additional
Salvador, Estonia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, India,
Indonesia, Israel, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Maqau, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mo-
rocco, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland
(areas which were not reviewed in 1996-1998), Qatar, Saint Lucia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. World Trade Organization, Fre-
quently Asked Questions About TRIPS in the WTO,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-efTRIPS-e/tripfqe.htm#Transition (last visited March 20, 2010).
11. Okediji, supra note 5, at 128.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 127-28.
14. Presently, the Least Developed Countries under TRIPS are: Angola, Bangladesh, Benin,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Djibouti, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauri-
tania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Tanza-
nia, Togo, Uganda, and Zambia. World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Least Developed
Countries, http://www.wto.orglenglish/thewto-e/whatis-e/tife/org7-e.htm (last visited March 20,
2010).
15. Okediji, supra note 5, at 128.
16. Gervais, supra note 6, at xv.
17. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2.
18. See id. art. 65.
19. See id. art. 1.
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standards do not contravene provisions in TRIPS. 20
After the initial implementation of TRIPS, developed countries at-
tempted to raise the minimum levels of IP protection on a multilateral basis
and reduce the flexibilities in TRIPS. 21 This push to enact TRIPS-plus lev-
els of protection became progressively more difficult and eventually
stalled.22 Reasons for the breakdown were varied and included many highly
critical analyses of the TRIPS negotiation process and a belief that it was
based on coercion, ignorance, and was a bad bargain for the developing
world. Also, a dispute arose between a collective group of African and
Latin American countries against pharmaceutical companies, who were
trying to enforce patent rights notwithstanding the fact that patients in those
countries could not afford the drugs. 23
In spite of their inability to secure TRIPS-plus standards in a multilat-
eral format, developed countries did not end their attempts there. Rather,
they shifted their focus to alternate means of achieving the goal of TRIPS-
plus standards of IP protection. 24 The new focal point for developed coun-
tries-especially the United States and the European Union-became se-
curing bilateral agreements 25  with developing and least-developed
countries. 26 Not surprisingly, these bilateral agreements almost always
contained TRIPS-plus IP standards and other provisions that precluded the
developing and least-developed nations from using the flexibilities inherent
in the TRIPS Agreement. 27
Another consequence of the bilateral agreements has been the outrage
of critics that ensued. Critics decried the actions of the United States and
European Union. 28 Scholars noted that the efforts of the United States and
European Union explicitly undermined the WTO and the TRIPS Agree-
ment by eliminating the policy options and sovereign discretion that it
granted.29 Moreover, developing and least-developed countries lack bar-
gaining power in bilateral agreements, which puts them in a "take-it or
20. See id.
21. See Gervais, supra note 6, at xvi.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.; Okediji, supra note 5, at 128.
25. Okediji, supra note 5, at 143 (commenting that the bilateral agreements could be in the form
of an aid agreement, economic agreement, trade agreement, investment treaty, economic arrangement,
or an intellectual property agreement).
26. Okediji, supra note 5, at 128.
27. Gervais, supra note 6, at xvi.
28. See, e.g., Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD
INTELL. PROP. 791 (2001); J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition
Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. INT'L L. & POL. ! 1(1997).
29. Okediji, supra note 5, at 128.
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leave-it" situation where their immediate economic, trade, and political
needs foreclose the possibility of rejecting the bilateral agreement because
of the TRIPS-plus provisions. 30 Ultimately, critics saw the bilateral agree-
ments as negating the gains made for developing and least-developed na-
tions in the TRIPS negotiations.
Today, it is taken for granted that international IP law is an integral
component of trade and development policy.31 Behind this backdrop, in
December 2007, the European Union concluded the EC-CARIFORUM
Agreement, an economic partnership agreement, with Antigua and Bar-
buda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, the Dominican Republic,
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Suriname, and Trinidad and To-
bago that included a mandatory exception to the rights conferred to an
owner of a trademark.32 The exception provided that "[t]he EC Party and
the Signatory CARIFORUM States shall provide for the fair use of descrip-
tive terms... as a limited exception to the rights conferred by a trade-
mark."'33 Although the trademark "fair use" exception in the EC-
CARIFORUM Agreement is allowable under Article 1734 of the TRIPS
Agreement, it is an atypical provision of a bilateral agreement between a
developed and a developing country, as the norm has been to negotiate
TRIPS-plus provisions.35 Even more interesting is that the provision re-
treats from the standard TRIPS protections and allows for fair use of de-
scriptive trademarks.
After the creation of the WTO and TRIPS, IP protections for trade-
marks have not been nearly as contentious as those for copyrights and pat-
ents. Despite the lack of controversy regarding trademarks, the EC-
CARIFORUM Agreement is the first agreement that mandates the trade-
mark exception allowable in Article 17 of the TRIPS Agreement. The
European Union, which includes developed countries rich in IP, included
an exception that will likely limit the trademark rights of its constituents.
This exception may be counterintuitive, but the roles that trademarks play
in society have been evolving and now the values implicated by allowing
trademark owners to monopolize and control the use of certain terms are
30. Id. at 129.
31. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property System: Treaties, Norms,
National Courts, and Private Ordering, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT:
STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 61, 62 (Daniel J. Gervais
ed., 2007).
32. See EC-CARIFORUM Agreement, supra note 2.
33. Id.
34. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 17.
35. Okediji, supra note 5, at 129.
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more fundamental. Therefore, the high watermark has likely been met in
terms of trademark owners' rights in the international perspective, provided
there is an internal push within developed countries to balance trademark
rights in the same manner that copyright and patent rights have been bal-
anced.
II. UNITED STATES TRADEMARK LAW
Prior to evaluating how the United States should proceed to interna-
tionally secure mandatory exceptions, a baseline must be set detailing
United States trademark law, its history, policy objectives, criticisms, and
exceptions including those that are sufficiently developed to be incorpo-
rated into future international bilateral agreements.
Since at least the Middle Ages, trademarks have been used to identify
the source of goods or services and punish craftsmen selling defective
goods or services. 36 Protection under law for trademark owners began in
the seventeenth century with the focus of the protection being misappro-
priation, where vendors would place the trademark of their rival on their
own goods. 37 The foundation of United States trademark law is the English
Common Law, with its main purpose being the prevention of misappropria-
tion.38 In 1946, Congress codified the common law with the passage of the
Lanham Act 39 using its power to regulate under the commerce clause.40
Historically, and still today, the primary functions served by trade-
marks in the United States are to protect consumers' expectations as to the
source of the goods or services, and to protect the goodwill, reputation, and
investment of the trademark owner.41 A trademark confers onto its owner a
limited property right with attendant concerns and costs of assigning that
right. For example, a competitive concern exists as an owner of a mark may
preclude competitors from entering or competing in a market by monopo-
lizing the terms used in the trademark.42 Additionally, a consumer-based
concern is present in assigning a right to certain terms as there is a desire
for consumers to have as much information as possible to allow them to
36. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (2006).
40. Unlike the ability of Congress to regulate patents and copyrights, which was explicitly written
into the Constitution.
41. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164-66 (1995); New Kids on the Block,
971 F.2d at 305.
42. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1969).
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make an informed decision regarding the purchase of goods or services. 43
Consequently, the owner of a mark is not given a right in gross, but rather a
limited right with exceptions and burdens in establishing a prima facie
cause of action.44 These limitations are becoming increasingly important in
the United States as society is becoming more brand conscious, using
trademarks in much different ways, and more interests are at stake in
trademark disputes.45
Trademark exceptions have taken a different role than those in the
copyright context. 46 Rather than the exceptions being the only limitation on
the right given to the mark owner, an internal check on the owners' rights
exists when establishing a prima facie cause of action.47 The limitation in
an infringement cause of action is that the plaintiff must demonstrate a
likelihood of consumer confusion.48 Although differences exist from juris-
diction to jurisdiction, courts will generally evaluate the following factors
when determining whether there is a likelihood of consumer confusion
between non-identical goods or services:
(1) the strength of the plaintiffs mark;
(2) the degree of similarity between the plaintiffs and the defendant's
marks;
(3) the proximity of the goods or services;
(4) the likelihood that plaintiff will bridge the gap;
(5) evidence of actual confusion;
(6) defendant's good faith in adopting the mark;
(7) the quality of defendant's product or service; and
(8) the sophistication of the buyers.49
When ruling on infringement cases, courts will frequently manipulate
the likelihood of confusion analysis and decide on that basis rather than the
actual underlying social policy or concern. 50 Scholars believe that the
courts have impeded the growth of trademark law defenses by deciding on
a likelihood of confusion basis rather than the true motivating social con-
43. See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 305.
44. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Lewis & Clark College of Law Ninth Distinguished IP Lecture:
Developing Defenses in Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 99, 100-08 (2009).
45. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademark Law and Social Norms, 1, 26-27 (2007),
http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/documents/EJWP0207.pdf.
46. See Dinwoodie, supra note 44, at 101-02.
47. See id.
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a) (registered marks); 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (unregistered marks).
49. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
50. See Dinwoodie, supra note 44, at 108-09.
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cern. 51 Examples of the social concerns that trademark cases may be de-
cided upon are promoting free competition, free speech, and the expression
of personal identity; facilitating public health concerns; enabling artistic
creativity; allowing comparative advertising; creating commercial certainty
for innovators; respecting commercial ethics; and avoiding the abuse of
rights in litigation. 52
Compounding the need for defenses are the ever-growing rights of
trademark owners, particularly the growth of the scope of the traditional
infringement cause of action, and the scope of the dilution cause of ac-
tion. 53 An actionable cause of action for trademark infringement now in-
cludes initial interest confusion, 54 post-sale confusion, 55 and reverse
confusion. 56 The scope of protected subject matter has also increased expo-
nentially.57 Furthermore, an actionable dilution case can be the result of
non-confusing uses. 58 Thus, there is concern due to the one-sided nature of
the property rights which clearly favors the owner of the trademark. These
issues emphasize the need to continually balance the rights of mark holders
against the fights of the public.
Despite the limitations in the development of trademark defenses,
there appears to be a push to more fully develop trademark law and its de-
fenses. First, Congress, in 2006, amended the Lanham Act's dilution laws 59
to include a fuller set of defenses. Furthermore, in 2004, the Supreme Court
addressed a circuit split regarding the proper interpretation of the fair use
defense to trademark infringement. 60 Each of these examples illustrate the
increased importance of trademarks due to the social and competitive val-
ues implicated, and highlight the resulting impetus to balance the law in
response to the new role of trademarks.
51. Id. at 108-12.
52. Id. at 121.
53. Id. at 120.
54. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).
55. See Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc.,
221 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1955).
56. See, e.g., Dreamwerks Prod., Inc. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 1998); Attrezzi v.
Maytag, 436 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2006).
57. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 159 (1995) (color); In re Clarke, 17
U.S.P.Q.2d 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (scent); In re Gen. Elec. Broad. Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. 560 (T.T.A.B.
1978) (sound).
58. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
59. See id.
60. See KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 116 (2004).
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A. United States Trademark Defenses
This section will describe current United States trademark infringe-
ment defenses, apply the exceptions to case law, and detail the policy rea-
sons for the defense.
1. Fair Use
The fair use defense to trademark infringement is found in Section
33(b)(4) 61 of the Lanham Act and states:
That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement
is a use, otherwise than as a mark... of a term or device which is de-
scriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods
or services of such party.... 62
In other words, the fair use exception allows individuals to use an-
other's mark to describe their product.
In KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., the Su-
preme Court resolved a circuit split and provided clarification on the
framework and application of the fair use exception. 63 Prior to the Court's
opinion, courts were interpreting the fair use exception in two predominant
ways. One side of the split required the defendant charged with infringe-
ment to prove that there was no likelihood of confusion about the origin of
the goods or services prior to being able to use the fair use exception.
* Whereas, the other side contended that the plaintiff must prove a likelihood
of consumer confusion in establishing a prima facie case that could later be
rebutted by the defendant using the fair use defense. 64 The Supreme Court
sided with the latter argument based on its statutory interpretation of the
Lanham Act,65 the illogical result in the course of litigation if the burden of
disproving likelihood of confusion were placed on the defendant,66 and the
common law tolerating some degree of confusion from the descriptive use
of words found within another's trademark. 67 The Court's analysis high-
lighted the policy concern of trademark owners commercially monopoliz-
ing a term where competitors are unable to compete in a market because
61. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4).
62. Id.
63. KP Permanent Make-up, Inc., 543 U.S. at 116-17.
64. Seeid. at 116-17.
65. See id. at 118.
66. See id. at 120.
67. See id. at 119-120 (quoting William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co. 265 U.S. 526, 528
(1924)) ("'[T]he use of a similar name by another to truthfully describe his own product does not
constitute a legal or moral wrong, even if its effect be to cause the public to mistake the origin or own-
ership of the product."').
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they are prohibited from using the term to describe their goods.68
An example of a case involving the fair use exception is Car-
Freshener Corp. v. SC. Johnson & Son, Inc., which was a trademark in-
fringement action brought by the manufacturer of pine-tree shaped air
fresheners. 69 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant's pine-tree shaped
"Glade Plug-In" air freshener violated its trademark rights.70 In evaluating
the claim, the court noted the "fundamental principle" that assigning a
property right in a term or mark does not proscribe others from using the
term or mark provided that it is a descriptive use and in good faith.71 This
principle prevents the trademark owner from gaining exclusive control over
the mark. When applying the fair use exception to the facts of the case, the
court found that the defendant's use was indeed a fair use because it had
used the pine-tree shape descriptively to refer to the scent of the air fresh-
ener, and the shape referred to the Christmas season when the air freshener
was sold. 72
2. Comparative Advertising
Another exception to trademark infringement is comparative advertis-
ing. Comparative advertising allows a company that duplicated an unpat-
ented product to use the trademark of the copied product to identify its own
goods in an advertisement. 73 This exception stemmed from the common
law where the concern was that a trademark owner would monopolize the
market since new competitors were unable to enter the market because they
could not efficiently inform the public what they were copying and offering
for sale.74 To bar a competitor from using a trademark to advise potential
customers of the equivalence of the products would impede the market and
deprive a competitor of the primary means of effective advertising.75 Thus,
the policy concerns that the comparative advertising exception seeks to
reinforce are the need for a free competitive market, and the desire for con-
sumers to have access to equivalent, cheaper goods.76
An illustration of the comparative advertising exception is shown in
68. See id. at 121-22.
69. Car-Freshener Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267 (2d Cir. 1995).
70. Id. at 268.
71. Id. at 269.
72. Id. at 270.
73. See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 563 (9th Cir. 1968).
74. See id. at 564.
75. See id. at 567-68.
76. See id.
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August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc. 77 Storck filed suit claiming trademark
infringement when Nabisco placed the following statement on its "Life
Savers" packaging, "25 [percent] LOWER IN CALORIES THAN
WERTHER'S," with a disclaimer asserting that Storck and Werther's were
not affiliated with Nabisco, and also noting Werther's is a trademark of
Storck.78 Finding no infringement, the court noted the benefit to consumers
of being able to quickly compare and note differences in products, having
access to diverse goods, and the benefit of having competition in the mar-
ket.79
3. Nominative Fair Use
The nominative fair use exception is the product of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals, at least under that label, and is applicable in cases where
a defendant uses a plaintiffs trademark to describe the plaintiff's product. 80
In other words, use in the nominative fair use context implicates the tradi-
tional trademark function of source identification. In contrast to classic fair
use where a plaintiffs mark is being used descriptively to refer to the de-
fendant's product, nominative fair use is the defendant using the plaintiffs
mark to refer to the plaintiff.81 The policy concerns that the nominative fair
use exception seeks to reinforce are a competitive marketplace and con-
sumer protection. 82 From a competition standpoint, the Lanham Act does
not require a producer of goods to use "second-best" communications when
advertising its product. 83 Indeed, useful social and commercial communica-
tion would be diminished if people were fearful of a lawsuit every time
reference was made to company using its trademark. 84
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in KP Permanent Make-
up, Inc., there is a split regarding the proper analytical test for nominative
77. August Storck K.G. v. Nabisco, Inc., 59 F.3d 616, 617-18 (7th Cir. 1995).
78. Id. at 618.
79. Id. at619-20.
80. See New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992);
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellshaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350, 350 (9th Cir. 1969).
81. Century 21 Real Estate v. Lendingtree, 425 F.3d 211,214 (3d Cir. 2005).
82. See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 305; Dinwoodie, supra note 44, at 131-32 (expressing
that the competition may more frequently be brought up in the derivative market context when dealing
with the nominative fair use exception).
83. See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 306-07 (noting that "it is virtually impossible to refer
to a particular product for purposes of comparison, criticism, point of reference or any other such
purpose without using the mark. For example, reference to a large automobile manufacturer based in
Michigan would not differentiate among the Big Three...."); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Hudson Pharm.
Corp., 715 F.2d 837, 842 n.12 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that "the Lanham Act does not compel a competi-
tor to resort to second-best communication").
84. See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 309-10.
2010]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
fair use cases. 85 The difference between the approaches is that the Ninth
Circuit replaces the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis with its
nominative fair use test in cases where nominative fair use is asserted. 86 In
contrast, the Third Circuit uses a two-step approach where the plaintiff
must first prove likelihood of confusion under a modified test, and then the
burden shifts to the defendant to prove that its nominative use was fair. 87
The approach taken by the Third Circuit treats the nominative fair use ex-
ception as an affirmative defense to trademark infringement instead of roll-
ing the analysis into the likelihood of confusion test.
An example in the Third Circuit of the nominative fair use defense is
Century 21 Real Estate v. Lendingtree, where the defendant, an internet
real estate referral company, used the mark of the plaintiff real estate com-
panies when referring to real estate agents who were franchisees of the
plaintiff.88 The plaintiff filed suit for trademark infringement and the de-
fendant asserted the nominative fair use defense. 89 In remanding the case to
the district court, the circuit court announced the nominative fair use test
where a defendant must show:
(1) use of the plaintiffs mark is necessary to describe both the
plaintiffs product or service and the defendant's product or ser-
vice;
(2) defendant uses only so much of the plaintiff's mark as is neces-
sary to describe the plaintiffs product; and
(3) defendant's conduct or language reflect the true and accurate
relationship between plaintiff and defendant's products or ser-
vices. 90
Furthermore, the circuit court modified the test for likelihood of confusion
to help the district court determine whether consumers are confused by the
manner in which the mark is being nominally used. 91
85. Compare Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 220-221, with New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d
at 302.
86. See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002).
87. See Century 21 Real Estate v. Lendingtree, 425 F.3d 211,222 (3d Cir. 2005).
88. Id.. at 214-15.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 222.
91. Id. at 225-26 (factors to be evaluated in the test for likelihood of confusion when the defen-
dant asserts the nominative fair use defense are:
(1) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and attention expected of
consumer when making a purchase; (2) the length of time the defendant has used the mark
without evidence of actual confusion; (3) the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; and
(4) the evidence of actual confusion.)
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4. Parody and Freedom of Expression
One other defense to trademark infringement is parody. Trademarks,
on occasion, exceed their source identifying function and become part of
the public's lexicon. 92 In these instances, trademarks are infused with an
expressive role completely apart from trademark function. 93 At this point,
there is a circuit split regarding the proper analysis of whether there is
trademark infringement due to the rights of the trademark owner invading
the region protected by the First Amendment. 94
One method of analysis is shown in Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. No-
vak, where the court used the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis to
find trademark infringement notwithstanding the defendant's parody de-
fense. 95 The defendant had placed a design logo that satirized nuclear war
and resembled the trademarks of Mutual of Omaha on t-shirts, sweatshirts,
buttons, caps and coffee mugs. 96 The district court found that the defendant
had infringed on Mutual of Omaha's trademarks because the parody design
created a likelihood of confusion as to Mutual of Omaha's sponsorship of
or affiliation with the defendant's merchandise. 97 In affirming the district
court's judgment, the circuit court reviewed the case using the Polaroid
factors98 and determined that there was indeed a likelihood of confusion. 99
The court reasoned that the First Amendment protections do not allow the
defendant to infringe on the "property" rights of Mutual of Omaha where
"adequate alternate avenues of communication exist." 100 In other words, a
parody or freedom of expression defense does not exist as an affirmative
defense, but rather is included in the traditional likelihood of confusion
analysis.
The alternate analysis of parody is the balancing approach that weighs
the public interest in free expression against the public interest in avoiding
92. Mattel, Inc. v. Universal Music Int'l Ltd., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 401 (8th Cir. 1987).
96. Id. at 398.
97. Id.
98. See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (asserting the
factors to determine whether a likelihood of confusion exists are: (1) the strength of the plaintiff's mark;
(2) the degree of similarity between the plaintiff's and the defendant's marks; (3) the proximity of the
goods or services; (4) the likelihood that plaintiff will bridge the gap; (5) evidence of actual confusion;
(6) defendant's good faith in adopting the mark; (7) the quality of defendant's product or service; and
(8) the sophistication of the buyers).
99. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 836 F.2d at 398-401.
100. Id. at 402 (noting that the defendant could still present the parody in a book, magazine, or
film).
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consumer confusion. 101 An example of the balancing approach is seen in
Cliff Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc.,102 where
the defendant produced a parody that satirized the cover of the well-known
study guide. Another example is Mattel, Inc. v. Universal Music Int'l
Ltd.,103 where a rock band produced a song that parodied Mattel's Barbie
doll. In each of the cases, the courts applied the balancing approach articu-
lated in Rogers v. Grimaldi.10 4 The courts' justification for using the
heightened standard for proving trademark infringement was that parody
was a form of artistic expression protected by the First Amendment, enti-
tling it to substantial freedom. 105 However, this expressive freedom is not
unbridled and, at times, must yield to a trademark owner's rights. 106 Thus,
the balancing approach seeks to evaluate and weigh the competing con-
cerns of the Lanham Act and the First Amendment. Consequently, a show-
ing of likelihood of confusion is not dispositive of trademark infringement
when the use involves free expression. 107
B. Which United States Trademark Defenses Have Been Sufficiently
Developed to be Included in Future International Agreements
Prior to including United States trademark defenses in an international
bilateral agreement, the defenses must be evaluated to determine if they
have been sufficiently doctrinally developed to be applied in an interna-
tional context. This is an important consideration because, without the
proper domestic foundation, the inclusion of these trademark defenses
could create confusion as to their proper application. Consequently, the
defenses may splinter due to varying interpretations and, thus, lack the
cohesive force necessary to achieve their purpose. The international setting
should not be a proving ground for the exceptions, but rather the exceptions
must be adequately developed to be applied internationally.
Evaluating each of the United States trademark defenses illustrates
that all are ripe to be applied internationally provided the Legislature or the
Supreme Court resolves the circuit split regarding the proper analytical
101. Cliff Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490, 494 (2d Cir.
1989).
102. Id.
103. 296 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2002).
104. 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that literary titles do not violate the Lanham Act
"unless the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic
relevance, unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.").
105. Cliff Notes, 886 F.2d at 493-94.
106. Id.
107. SeeMattel, 296 F.3d at 900-01.
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approach for both nominative fair use and parody. After KP Permanent
Make-up, Inc., the proper framework for the fair use exception was laid out
with the exception acting as an affirmative defense after the plaintiff satis-
fies the prima facie likelihood of confusion requirement. 108 Additionally,
the comparative advertising exception has been sufficiently developed, but
is now likely to be included in the nominative fair use exception. Both
comparative advertising and nominative fair use protect a defendant's use
of the plaintiff's mark in a source identifying manner. However, compara-
tive advertising only involves a use in the advertising context, while nomi-
native fair use encompasses all contexts. Therefore, comparative
advertising exists as a subset of nominative fair use.
An ancillary benefit of resolving the proper analytical framework for
the exceptions, prior to pursuing them internationally, would be to set the
course for the proper domestic treatment of trademark exceptions. As Pro-
fessor Dinwoodie emphasized, "real defenses" must be established in
United States trademark law that are not wrapped up in the likelihood of
confusion analysis.109 But rather, they should exist as affirmative defenses
that can be asserted after a prima facie claim of infringement has been es-
tablished, and recognize the underlying social policy objectives and val-
ues.1 10 The possibility of entering into an international bilateral agreement
would provide the Legislature with an ideal opportunity to evaluate the
trademark defenses, balance the rights of mark holders and the public, and
establish "real defenses."
III. THE EC-CARIFORUM AGREEMENT
The EC-CARIFORUM Agreement is the first international agreement
that mandates the trademark rights exception permitted in Article 17 of the
TRIPS Agreement. Article 17 provides that WTO "[m]embers may provide
limited exceptions to the rights conferred by a trademark, such as fair use
of descriptive terms, provided that such exceptions take account of the
legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of third parties." I l l
Thus, Article 17 permits the creation of exceptions in a country's national
trademark law. The EC-CARIFORUM Agreement states that
[t]he EC Party and the Signatory CARl-FORUM States shall provide for
the fair use of descriptive terms, including geographical indications, as a
limited exception to the rights conferred by a trademark. Such limited
108. See KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression 1, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
109. See Dinwoodie, supra note 44, at 132-37.
110. Id.
111. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 17.
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exceptions shall take account of the legitimate interests of the owner of
the trademark and of third parties. 112
Analysis of the EC-CARIFORUM Agreement reveals that it mandates
a typical fair use exception to trademark infringement for descriptive terms.
Of additional note is how the scope of the EC-CARIFORUM exception is
limited to the example listed in Article 17 of fair use as an acceptable limi-
tation to trademark rights. Various potential reasons exist for the fair use
exception being the only trademark defense enumerated in the EC-
CARIFORUM Agreement, such as the European Union's desire to develop
international trademark defenses incrementally or, alternatively, uncer-
tainty as to the allowable maximum scope of trademark exceptions under
the TRIPS Agreement.
Today, the trademark exceptions clause is an extremely abnormal pro-
vision in a bilateral agreement. The standard IP provision included in a
bilateral agreement contains TRIPS-plus provisions. In these provisions,
the developed IP-rich country secures more expansive IP rights, and the
developing country accepts the agreement notwithstanding the TRIPS-plus
provisions due to more immediate economic, trade, or political needs. In
the EC-CARIFORUM Agreement, the European Union, despite its superior
bargaining power, decided to "buck the trend" and limit trademark rights.
The EC-CARIFORUM Agreement is the first international attempt to bal-
ance trademark rights.
A number of policy reasons and other external factors likely influ-
enced the European Union's decision to include the fair use trademark
exception. There was likely a push by constituents who lobbied that trade-
mark exceptions were needed after realizing that the pendulum has swung
too far in the favor of trademark owners' rights. Moreover, commercial
monopolization of descriptive terms likely affected competition in the mar-
ket as trademark owners-whether from the developed or developing coun-
try-prevented new market entrants as they could not properly describe
their product. Another possibility is the campaigning by well-funded non-
government organizations (NGOs) for more rights for developing coun-
tries. The NGOs' social consciousness could have sparked discussion that
strong trademark rights have inhibited the advancement of developing
countries. Whatever the reasons for the inclusion of the fair use exception,
the European Union has commenced the process of balancing trademark
rights.
112. See EC-CARIFORUM Agreement, supra note 2.
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IV. WHY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD INCLUDE EXCEPTIONS TO
TRADEMARK RIGHTS IN FUTURE INTERNATIONAL BILATERAL
AGREEMENTS
Now that the European Union has taken the first step and included
trademark exceptions in an international bilateral agreement, the United
States should follow the European Union's lead and continue the move-
ment to balance international trademark rights. This section will discuss
how the United States would negotiate the trademark exceptions, the moti-
vating factors for pursuing the exceptions, and the proposed scope of the
exceptions.
A. Any International IP Agreement the United States Negotiates Must be
on Bilateral Basis
TRIPS is the most comprehensive multilateral IP agreement and estab-
lishes mandatory minimum standards of protection. 1 3 After the initial im-
plementation of TRIPS, the United States attempted to raise the minimum
levels of IP protection on a multilateral basis. 114 Eventually, the ability to
enact increasing levels of multilateral IP protection became progressively
more difficult until it was no longer possible. 1 5 However, the United
States did not stop advancing its international IP agenda; instead, the focus
shifted back its former well-established means of negotiating on a bilateral
basis. This change brought with it a number of attendant advantages, but
also prompted many criticisms.
Advantages of negotiating on a bilateral basis include the fact that the
United States no longer needed to avoid contentious issues; agree on the
least common denominator, allowing national discretion over the remainder
of an issue; or deal with the "dead weight" 116 in international negotia-
tions. 117 Furthermore, when TRIPS was ratified, the United States and
other developed countries saw the greatest losses, and consequently bilat-
113. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 2; Okediji, supra note 5, at 128 (asserting that the "TRIPS
Agreement remains the premier international intellectual property treaty").
114. See Gervais, supra note 6, at xvi.
115. Id.
116. Countries that have little to offer the United States in terms of a market to exploit the goods
but nonetheless receive the benefit of the concessions given by the United States. Okediji, supra note 5,
at 144.
117. Id. at 144-46.
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eral agreements were a means to lessen the multilateral losses. 118 Addition-
ally, since international IP solutions are sought more quickly, bilateral
agreements are a more efficient means of achieving that goal. Another ad-
vantage of bilateral deal making is that the United States can consolidate
multiple bilateral agreements into a multilateral device. 19 This allows the
United States to break down coalitions of developing countries and impose
its foreign policy.
Rightfully, the United States' foreign bilateral IP policy has been criti-
cized. One criticism is that United States' bilateral agreements are the pri-
mary means by which most TRIPS-plus provisions are agreed to. 120 These
TRIPS-plus provisions take the flexibility out of the TRIPS Agreement,
which has affected both sovereign discretion and the advancement of de-
veloping countries. 121 In conclusion, critics believe that the bilateral efforts
of the United States explicitly undermine the WTO and the TRIPS Agree-
ment, which in turn negates the gains TRIPS made for developing coun-
tries. 122
In spite of the criticisms, bilateral agreements are still the dominant
way the United States conducts its foreign IP policy. This policy is likely to
continue for the foreseeable future as it is doubtful that the opposition to
multilateral TRIPS-plus provisions will subside. 123 Accordingly, any at-
tempt to efficiently negotiate and implement exceptions to trademark rights
must be done in a bilateral manner.
B. Why the United States Should Negotiate Trademark Exceptions
Prior to the United States attempting to secure trademark exceptions,
the domestic and international circumstances must demonstrate a need for
the trademark rights to be balanced. It is unlikely that the United States, an
IP-rich country, would negotiate exceptions to the trademark rights of its
constituents without external motivating factors. The requisite motivating
factors may now be present in the international IP debate as the stakes have
been raised regarding IP rights due to their global implications.124
Linking trade and IP rights in the TRIPS Agreement has led to more
118. Id. at 144.
119. Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The International Intellectual Property Law System: New Actors, New
Institutions, New Sources, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 205, 209-10 (2006).
120. Okediji, supra note 5, at 129.
121. Id. at 130.
122. Id. at 129.
123. Id. at 140.
124. See DINWOODIE, supra note 31, at 80.
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critical attention of international IP rights. 125 Critics are now voicing their
opinions regarding the balance struck in bilateral agreements, which in-
clude TRIPS-plus provisions because they believe that the agreements are
too one-sided, with developing countries conceding too many rights. 126
Further increasing the visibility of international IP rights are NGOs, which
enhance the range of views and advocate substantive social policies. 127
Moreover, a growing realization exists that expansive IP rights have a
negative impact on the advancement of developing countries. 128 In sum,
critics and NGOs are demanding accountability in the IP system due to the
high social costs of increasing IP protection.129
Due to this heightened scrutiny, IP rights have already been criticized
and balanced in the other IP regimes. In copyright, the rights have been,
and continue to be, balanced because of the one-sidedness of rights in the
TRIPS Agreement that favored the copyright owner. 130 The rights imbal-
ance had the potential to create long term problems with the creative and
innovative process. 131 Without access to existing works, new "authors"
cannot build on existing knowledge or technology, which is the primary
means by which most innovation occurs. 132 As a result, the access to
knowledge campaign began and sought to include a means of access in
international IP law. 133 The movement underscores the fundamental rights
that are implicit in providing access and dissemination of knowledge goods
including personal, social, and economic advancement and the exercise of
political power. 134 Furthermore, access to the knowledge goods may pro-
vide educational materials for those who lack them, and potentially lead to
rapid advances of innovative technologies. 135 Compounding the need for
exceptions, which in turn provides access, is the availability of communica-
tion technology that magnifies the public benefit.136 Presently, technology
allows for far-reaching worldwide distribution of knowledge goods assur-
ing that access in one market can be easily disseminated to other mar-
125. Id.
126. Id. at 88.
127. Id. at 92.
128. Okediji, supra note 5, at 146.
129. P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Ruth L. Okediji, Conceiving an International Instrument on Limita-
tions and Exceptions to Copyright 10, http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/hugenholtz/finalreport2008.pdf
(last updated March 6, 2008).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 11.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 37-38.
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kets. 137 In conclusion, exceptions to copyright infringement have been-
and continue to be-created because the owners' IP rights were too strong,
and the resulting inequity required the rights to be balanced.
As the role that trademarks play in society has increased, so too have
the implications and social concerns of awarding strong trademark
rights. 138 Today, trademarks are no longer solely confined to their tradi-
tional functions of source identification and protection of the mark owners'
goodwill. In addition, trademark rights now involve free competition, free
speech, expression of personal identity, public health concerns, artistic
creativity, comparative advertising, commercial certainty for innovators,
and commercial ethics. 139 Thus, trademark rights have far-reaching effects
aside from consumer confusion. Without exceptions to trademark rights,
there is a resulting imbalance favoring the trademark owner.
An imbalance is seen in United States trademark law due to factors
such as the expansion of protectable subject matter and liability for confu-
sion that does not occur at the point of sale, such as post-sale and initial
interest confusion. Accordingly, there has been criticism that current
United States trademark exceptions are inadequate in the face of ever-
growing owners' rights. 140 As a result of the imbalance in rights, the Su-
preme Court,141 Circuit Courts, 142 and the Legislature 143 have interpreted
or drafted trademark exceptions that seek to balance the rights of mark
holders against the rights of the public. Conversely, in the international
context trademark owners have an unbridled right as the TRIPS Agreement
does not require trademark exceptions even though they are allowable un-
der Article 17.
International trademark law is following in the footsteps of copyright
law and now requires a balancing of the owners' and the public's rights.
Much like copyright law, the timing is right for the United States to begin
to negotiate bilateral agreements that include trademark exceptions. This is
evident from factors that indicate that trademark rights are already on the
radar of critics and NGOs, who are demanding accountability and fairness
in the trademark system. First, the inclusion of the fair use exception in the
EC-CARIFORUM Agreement indicates that the campaign to balance
137. Id.
138. See Dinwoodie, supra note 45, at 1.
139. See Dinwoodie, supra note 44, at 121.
140. See id. at 120.
141. See KP Permanent Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression 1, Inc., 543 U.S. I1, 111 (2004).
142. See Century 21 Real Estate v. Lendingtree, 425 F.3d 211, 214 (3d Cir. 2005); Mattel, Inc. v.
Universal Music Int'l Ltd., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
143. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
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trademark rights is gaining traction and is much more than a grassroots
movement. Furthermore, the new roles that trademarks have taken on as-
sure that the exposure and visibility of trademarks will only increase in the
future. In sum, the timing is suitable for the United States to internationally
negotiate trademark exceptions as the requisite motivating factors are cur-
rently present.
Although the timing may be appropriate, the United States will not
pursue trademark exceptions without substantive reasons that justify their
inclusion. Presently, these reasons exist and the United States should nego-
tiate trademark exceptions. First, competitive concerns are present for both
the United States and developing countries in awarding unchecked trade-
mark rights. The trademark owner can monopolize the use of the term,
which can prevent competitors from entering the market because they are
unable to describe their products. This is especially significant because
most foreign counties utilize a "first to register" system in awarding trade-
mark rights, as opposed to the United States' use-based system. Thus,
trademark rights are awarded by merely filing the appropriate paperwork,
rather than adhering to the United States' more stringent use requirement.
Without international trademark exceptions, the outcome of this procedural
differentiation could bar companies in the United States from entering a
foreign market due to the mere registration of a term in the that country.
This scenario is similar to the access to knowledge campaign in the copy-
right context, where copyright holders were prohibited from hoarding tech-
nology and not allowing access to others, which impeded innovation.
Another competitive concern exists regarding the use of a trademark
to describe the mark owner's product, which involves the traditional
source-identification function of trademark. New market entrants of alter-
nate goods may be precluded from competing in the market if they are
unable to refer to the goods that they substitute. Furthermore, competition
in derivative markets will suffer if manufacturers are unable to identify the
complementary products that are compatible with each manufacturer. 144
Also from an efficiency standpoint, competitors would be required to resort
to "second-best" communications when advertising a product. As a result,
United States' corporations could once again be precluded from competing
in a foreign market unless trademark exceptions are secured.
An additional factor favoring the United States securing international
trademark exceptions is consumer concerns. To make an informed pur-
chase, consumers need as much information as possible. Without a fair use
144. See Dinwoodie, supra note 44, at 131-32.
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exception, terms can be monopolized which will deprive consumers of
useful descriptive information about the product. Furthermore, without
nominative fair use, a second-comer who enters the market to offer a com-
parable good is unable to refer to the first-comer and, therefore, the con-
sumer will be denied information regarding the equivalence of the
products. Due to globalization, each of these situations will become more
prevalent as an increasing number of products, for which consumers re-
quire descriptive information, enter the market. Consumers in both the
United States and foreign countries will greatly benefit from exceptions to
trademark infringement that allow for the accurate description and a decla-
ration of the equivalence of the goods in advertising.
A final reason why the United States should negotiate bilateral inter-
national exceptions to trademark rights relates to freedom of expression.
Without exceptions, a trademark owner is given a monopoly over a mark
and is able to restrict the public's use. This creates a potential for private
censorship, where corporations are taking words out of circulation and
control usage as individuals fear that their use will subject them to liability.
This is especially important as trademarks frequently exceed their tradi-
tional function of source identification and take on an independent expres-
sive role. The possibility of encroaching upon an individual's expressive
right is significant because of its fundamental nature. The First Amendment
and foreign national constitutional principles substantiate the fundamental
nature of the freedom of expression. Thus, due to the new expressive func-
tion served by trademarks and the fundamental nature of the freedom of
expression, the United States would be justified in seeking an international
freedom of expression defense to trademark infringement.
C. Proposed Scope of the International Trademark Exceptions
It has already been established that the timing and substantive reasons
exist for the United States to secure international trademark exceptions in a
bilateral manner, yet the scope of the exceptions still must be determined.
The United States could follow the example set by the European Union and
merely secure a fair use exception, or the United States could negotiate
more extensive exceptions.
Fair use is the natural starting point for determining the scope of an in-
ternational agreement. It has already been included in the EC-
CARIFORUM Agreement and taken on a role in the United States as an
affirmative defense to infringement, rather than merely being subsumed
into the likelihood of confusion analysis. Nominative fair use, although
only present in United States trademark law, also has the potential to be
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successfully applied internationally as an affirmative defense. Moreover,
comparative advertising still serves an important function in the market-
place and may become progressively more important as additional equiva-
lent goods enter the marketplace. Finally, the freedom of expression
exception is becoming increasingly necessary as trademarks take on differ-
ent roles apart from their classic function of source identification.
Other factors exist that must be considered when determining the
scope of the defenses. The overall benefit of including the trademark ex-
ception must be considered where a more extensive set of defenses will
protect a larger set of the public's rights. Including an extensive set of de-
fenses must be weighed against inconsistencies in the application of trade-
mark exceptions, and whether the defenses will be applied in the likelihood
of confusion analysis or exist as an affirmative defense. Furthermore, the
complexity of dealing and lawmaking in an international environment must
also be considered.
Taking all these factors into account, the proposed scope of the trade-
mark defenses in future bilateral agreements is to include fair use and
nominative fair use. Fair use and nominative fair use should be included
due to the consumer and competitive concerns that they reinforce and their
ease in application in the international setting. Fair use will prevent trade-
mark owners from monopolizing terms, which could preclude new entrants
to markets because of the inability to accurately describe their product.
Furthermore, nominative fair use will allow competitors to advertise the
equivalence of their goods and not require the use of "second-best" com-
munications to describe their products. This will increase competition in
the market. Finally, consumers will benefit from both trademark exceptions
as accurate descriptions of goods and their equivalents will allow consum-
ers to make informed purchasing decisions.
The comparative advertising exception should not be included inde-
pendently in a future bilateral agreement because it is a subset of nomina-
tive fair use-which will be included-so there is no need to include it
separately. Also, an exception for freedom of expression will not be in-
cluded because of the difficulty in applying it internationally. The excep-
tion is currently included in many foreign countries' constitutions and the
United States may be overreaching in telling foreign countries how to in-
terpret their constitutions.
CONCLUSION
The campaign to balance trademark rights has already begun as the
EC-CARIFORUM Agreement includes a mandatory exception to trade-
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mark rights. Following the European Union's lead, the United States
should also negotiate mandatory trademark exceptions into future bilateral
agreements and build upon this momentum to balance trademark rights.
However, the United States should expand upon the exception in the EC-
CARIFORUM Agreement by including both fair use and nominative fair
use exceptions.
